Multiple Goods, Consumer Heterogeneity and Revealed Preference

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Blundell, Kristensen and Matzkin ()

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• Blundell, Kristensen, Matzkin (2011a) "Bounding Quantile Demand Functions Using Revealed Preference Inequalities"

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- Focus here is on identification and estimation when there are many heterogeneous consumers, a finite number of markets (prices) and non-additive heterogeneity.

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• Consider choices over a weakly separable subset of G + 1 goods, y_1, \ldots, y_G, y_0

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- Consider choices over a weakly separable subset of G + 1 goods, y_1, \ldots, y_G, y_0
- $(p_1, p_2, ..., p_G, I)$ prices (for goods 1, ...G) and total budget, $[\mathbf{p}, I]$

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- Observed demands are a solution to

$$Max_{y} \quad U\left(y_{1},...,y_{G},I-\sum_{g=1}^{G}p_{g}y_{g},\mathbf{z},\varepsilon_{1},...,\varepsilon_{G}\right)$$

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• Typically dealing with a finite number of markets (prices) and many (heterogeneous) consumers.

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• FOC - system of simultaneous equations with nonadditive unobservables

$$\frac{U_g\left(y_1, ..., y_G, I - \sum_{g=1}^G p_g y_g, \mathbf{z}, \varepsilon_1, ..., \varepsilon_G\right)}{U_0\left(y_1, ..., y_G, I - \sum_{g=1}^G p_g y_g, \mathbf{z}, \varepsilon_1, ..., \varepsilon_G\right)} = p_g \quad \text{for } g = 1, ..., G$$

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• Demand functions - reduced form system with nonadditive unobservables

$$Y_g = d_g \left(p_1, ..., p_G, I, \mathbf{z}, \varepsilon_1, ..., \varepsilon_G \right)$$
 for $g = 1, ..., G$.

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The aim in this research is to use the *Revealed Preference inequalities* to place bounds on predicted demands for each consumer [ε, z] for any *p*₁,..., *p*_G, *l*;

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$$Y_g = d_g\left(p_1,...,p_G,I,\mathbf{z},arepsilon_1,...,arepsilon_G
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 - also derive results on bounds for infinitessimal changes in p and I.

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- For each price regime the d_g are expansion paths (or Engel curves) for each heterogeneous consumer of type [ε, z]

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 - also derive results on bounds for infinitessimal changes in p and I.
- For each price regime the d_g are expansion paths (or Engel curves) for each heterogeneous consumer of type [ε, z]
- Key assumptions will pertain to the dimension and direction of unobserved heterogeneity ε, and to the specification of observed heterogeneity z.

• The system is invertible, at $(p_1, ..., p_G, I, z)$ if for any $(Y_1, ..., Y_G)$, there exists a unique value of $(\varepsilon_1, ..., \varepsilon_G)$ satisfying the system of equations.

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Invertibility

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- Each unique value of $(\varepsilon_1, ..., \varepsilon_G)$ identifies a particular consumer.
- Example with G + 1 = 2: (ignoring z for the time being) suppose

 $U(y_1, y_0, \varepsilon) = v(y_1, y_0) + w(y_1, \varepsilon)$

subject to $p y_1 + y_0 \le I$

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• Assume that the functions v and w are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave, and that $\partial^2 w(y_1, \varepsilon)/\partial y_1 \partial \varepsilon > 0$.

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- Assume that the functions v and w are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave, and that ∂²w(y₁, ε)/∂y₁∂ε > 0.
- Then, the demand function for y_1 is invertible in ε

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• By the Implicit Function Theorem,

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- By the Implicit Function Theorem,
- y₁ = d (p₁, I, ε) that solves the first order conditions exists and satisfies for all p, I, ε,

 $\frac{\partial d\left(p,I,\varepsilon\right)}{\partial\varepsilon}$

$$= -\frac{w_{10}(y_1, \varepsilon)}{v_{11}(y_1, l - py_1) - 2 v_{10}(y_1, l - py_1) p + v_{00}(y_1, l - py_1) p^2 + w_{11}(z_1, l - py_1) p^2} > 0$$

and the denominator is < 0 by unique optimization.

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and the denominator is < 0 by unique optimization.

• Hence, the demand function for y_1 is invertible in ε .

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• Assume that d is strictly increasing in ε , over the support of ε , and ε is distributed independently of (p, I).

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Identification when G+1=2

- Assume that d is strictly increasing in ε , over the support of ε , and ε is distributed independently of (p, I).
- Then, for every p, I, ε ,

$$F_{\varepsilon}(\varepsilon) = F_{Y|p,I}(d(p, I, \varepsilon))$$

where F_{ε} is the cumulative distribution of ε and $F_{Y|p,l}$ is the cumulative distribution of Y given (p, l).

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where F_{ε} is the cumulative distribution of ε and $F_{Y|p,l}$ is the cumulative distribution of Y given (p, l).

• Assuming that ε is distributed independently of (p, l), the demand function is strictly increasing in ε , and F_{ε} is strictly increasing at ε ,

$$d\left(p',l',\varepsilon\right) - d\left(\widetilde{p},\widetilde{l},\varepsilon\right) = F_{Y|(p,l)=(p',l')}^{-1}\left(F_{Y|(p,l)=(\widetilde{p},\widetilde{l})}\left(y_{1}\right)\right) - y_{1}$$

where y_1 is the observed consumption when budget is (\tilde{p}, \tilde{l}) .

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• If consumer ε satisfies Revealed Preference then the inequalities:

 $\widetilde{p}_1\left(y_1' - \widetilde{y}_1\right) + \widetilde{p}_0(y_0' - \widetilde{y}_0) \leq \widetilde{l} \quad \Rightarrow \quad p_1'\left(y_1' - \widetilde{y}_1\right) + p_0'(y_0' - \widetilde{y}_0) < l'$

allow us to bound demand on a new budget (\tilde{p}, \tilde{l}) for each consumer ε , where $y'_1 = d(p', l', \varepsilon)$ and $y'_0 = (l' - p'_1 d(p', l', \varepsilon))/p'_0$.

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allow us to bound demand on a new budget (\tilde{p}, \tilde{l}) for each consumer ε , where $y'_1 = d(p', l', \varepsilon)$ and $y'_0 = (l' - p'_1 d(p', l', \varepsilon))/p'_0$.

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- In this paper we show same set identification results hold for each consumer of type $[\varepsilon_1, ..., \varepsilon_G]$ under RP inequality restrictions

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We know

$$\frac{\partial d(p, I, \varepsilon)}{\partial (p, I)} = -\left[\frac{\partial F_{Y|(p, I)}(d(p, I, \varepsilon))}{\partial y}\right]^{-1} \frac{\partial F_{Y|(p, I)}(d(p, I, \varepsilon))}{\partial (p, I)}$$

(Matzkin (1999), Chesher (2003)).

 \bullet And since each consumer ε satisfies the Integrability Conditions

$$\frac{\partial d(p, I, \varepsilon)}{\partial p} \le -y \left(\frac{\partial F_{Y|(p, I)}(y)}{\partial y}\right)^{-1} \left(\frac{\partial F_{Y|(p, I)}(y)}{\partial I}\right)$$

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• Which allow us to bound the effect of an infinitessimal change in price.

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- Figures of quantile expansion paths, demand bounds and confidence sets in Figures 3 and 4.

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- As before we assume ε_1 is scalar and c_1 is strictly increasing in ε_1 .

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 - In although at the cost of strengthening assumptions on the specification of prices and/or demographics.
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- Extends the monotonicity result to conditional demands:
- **>** Permits estimation by QIV.
- ▶ Implyies that the ranking of goods on the budget line [y₀ : y₁] is *invariant* to y₂, (as well as to I and p) even though y₂ is non-separable from [y₀ : y₁].

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• corresponding to standard demands

$$\begin{array}{rcl} y_1 & = & d_1 \left(p_1, p_2, I, z_1, \varepsilon_1, z_2, \varepsilon_2 \right) \\ y_2 & = & d_2 \left(p_1, p_2, I, z_1, \varepsilon_1, z_2, \varepsilon_2 \right) \end{array}$$

- Mirroring the discussion of ε₁ and ε₂, we also introduce exclusive observed heterogeneity z₁ and z₂.
- Conditional demands then take the form:

$$y_1 = c_1(p_1, \widetilde{l}, y_2, z_1, \varepsilon_1)$$

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• We may also wish to group together the heterogeneity terms in some restricted way, for example

$$\begin{array}{rcl} y_1 & = & d_1 \left(p_1, p_2, I, z_1 + \varepsilon_1, z_2 + \varepsilon_2 \right) \\ y_2 & = & d_2 \left(p_1, p_2, I, z_1 + \varepsilon_1, z_2 + \varepsilon_2 \right). \end{array}$$

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• These restricted specifications will be important in our discussion of identification and estimation

• Suppose preferences are such that $[y_1, y_0]$ form a separable sub-group within $[y_1, y_0, y_2]$. In this case, utility has the recursive form

$$U(y_0, y_1, y_2, z_1, z_2, \varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2) = V(u(y_0, y_1, z_1, \varepsilon_1), y_2, z_2, \varepsilon_2)$$

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- The conditional demands then take the triangular form:

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- \blacktriangleright Can relax preference assumptions to allow ε_1 to enter c_2 .
- z₁ (and p₁) is excluded from c₂ and could act an instrument for y₁ in the QCF estimation of c₂, as in Chesher (2003) and Imbens and Newey (2009).

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• Blundell and Matzkin (2010) derive the complete set of *if and only if* conditions for nonseparable simultaneous equations models that generate triangular systems and therefore permit estimation by the control function (QCF) approach.

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- The BM conditions cover preferences that include the conditional recursive separability form above.
- For example,

$$V(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2, y_2) + W(\varepsilon_1, y_1, y_2) + y_0$$

e.g.

$$=\left(\varepsilon_{1}+\varepsilon_{2}\right) \ u\left(y_{2}\right) +\varepsilon_{1} \ \log\left(y_{1}-u\left(y_{2}\right)\right) +y_{0}$$

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• If demand functions are invertible in $(\varepsilon_1, ..., \varepsilon_G)$, we can write $(\varepsilon_1, ..., \varepsilon_G)$ as

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$$\varepsilon_{G} = r_{G}(y_{1}, ..., y_{G}, p_{1}, ..., p_{G}, I, z_{1}, ..., z_{G})$$

• Can use the transformation of variables equation to determine identification (Matzkin (2010))

$$f_{Y|p,l,z}(y) = f_{\varepsilon}(r(y,p,l,z)) \left| \frac{\partial r(y,p,l,z)}{\partial y} \right|$$

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• As we show, estimation can proceed using the average derivative method of Matzkin (2010).

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• $U(y, I - p'y) + V(y, z + \varepsilon)$ and f_{ε} primitive functions

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• Then, by Gale and Nikaido (1965), the system is invertible: There exist functions $r^1, ..., r^G$ such that

$$\epsilon_{1} + z_{1} = r^{1} (y_{1}, ..., y_{G}, p_{1}, ..., p_{K}, I)$$

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$$\epsilon_{G} + z_{G} = r^{G} (y_{1}, ..., y_{G}, p_{1}, ..., p_{K}, I)$$

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• Constructive identification follows as in Matzkin (2007). Assume

$$rac{\partial f_arepsilon(arepsilon)}{\partialarepsilon}=0 \qquad <=> \qquad arepsilon=arepsilon^*$$

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$$f_{Y|p,l,z}(y) = f_{\varepsilon}(r(y,p,l)-z) \left| \frac{\partial r(y,p,l)}{\partial y} \right|$$

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• Taking derivatives with respect to z

$$\frac{\partial f_{Y|p,l,z}(y)}{\partial z} = \frac{\partial f_{\varepsilon}(r(y,p,l)-z)}{\partial \varepsilon} \left| \frac{\partial r(y,p,l)}{\partial y} \right|$$

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$$\frac{\partial f_{Y|p,l,z}(y)}{\partial z} = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{\partial f_{\varepsilon}(r(y,p,l)-z)}{\partial \varepsilon} = 0$$

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• Note that
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• and

$$\frac{\partial f_{\varepsilon}(r(y, p, l) - z)}{\partial \varepsilon} = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad r(y, p, l) - z = \varepsilon^{*}$$

$$\frac{\partial f_{Y|p,l,z^*}(y)}{\partial z} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial f_{Y|p,I,z^*}(y)}{\partial z} = 0$$

• Then,

 $r(y, p, I) = \varepsilon^* + z^*$

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• Identification of $r \Rightarrow$ identification of h

$$\frac{\partial f_{Y|p,I,z^*}(y)}{\partial z} = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad y = h(p, I, \varepsilon^* + z^*)$$

Average derivative estimator

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 $\frac{\widehat{\partial r(y)}}{\partial y} = \widehat{r}_{y}(y) = \left(\widehat{T}_{ZZ}(y)\right)^{-1} \widehat{T}_{ZY}(y)$

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 \bullet Elements of \widehat{T}_{ZZ} and \widehat{T}_{ZY} are average derivative type estimators

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{T}_{y_j z_k}(y) &= \left(\int \frac{\partial \log \widehat{f}_{y|z}(y)}{\partial y_j} \frac{\partial \log \widehat{f}_{y|z}(y)}{\partial z_k} \omega(z) dz \right) \\ &- \left(\int \frac{\partial \log \widehat{f}_{y|z}(y)}{\partial y_j} \omega(z) dz \right) \left(\int \frac{\partial \log \widehat{f}_{y|z}(y)}{\partial z_k} \omega(z) dz \right) \end{aligned}$$

Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989), Newey (1994)

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Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989), Newey (1994)

• Use mode assumption on ε , to recover the level of r at some value of y.

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Empirical example for the multiple good case

• Three good model with commodity specific observed heterogeneity

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- Three good model with commodity specific observed heterogeneity
- Food, services and other goods.
- Assume that unobserved preference for food exactly matches variation family size/age composition, and are independent conditional on income (and other observed heterogeneity).
- Similarly, assume unobserved preference for services exactly matches age/birth cohort of adults.

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- Extend to an index on z.

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- 🕨 Figure 5....

 Show conditions for identification and estimation of individual demands in the two good and the multiple good case with nonadditive/nonseparable heterogeneity.

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- Focus on the case of discrete prices (finite markets) and many heterogeneous consumers.

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- Show conditions for identification and estimation of individual demands in the two good and the multiple good case with nonadditive/nonseparable heterogeneity.
- Focus on the case of discrete prices (finite markets) and many heterogeneous consumers.

 Show how to use restrictions implied by revealed preference / integrability to bound the distribution of predicted demand at unobserved prices (policy counterfactual).

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Figure 1a: The distribution of demands across consumers indexed by ' ϵ '




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


Figure 1b: Monotonicity in 'ɛ' and rank preserving on the budget constraint




Figure 1c: The quantile expansion path




Figure 2a: Generating a Support Set with RP for consumer 'ɛ'




Figure 2a: Generating a Support Set with RP for consumer 'ɛ'




Figure 2a: Generating a Support Set with RP for consumer 'ɛ'





Figure 2d. Improving the support set with *e-bounds*, for consumer 'ɛ'







Figure 3a. Unrestrcited Quantile Expansion Paths: Food, 1986






Figure 4a: Quantile (RP-Restricted) Bounds on Demand (Median Income, T=.5)




Figure 4b: Quantile (RP-Restricted) Confidence Sets (Median Income, T=.1)




Figure 4c: Quantile (RP-Restricted) Confidence Sets (Median Income, T=.5)




Figure 4d: Quantile (RP-Restricted) Confidence Sets (Median Income, T=.9)




Figure 4e: Quantile (RP-Restricted) Confidence Sets (25% Income, T=.5)





Figure 4f: Quantile (RP-Restricted) Confidence Sets (75% Income, T=.5)






Figure 5. Relative price data: 1975 to 1999 and price path




Figure 4a: Typical Joint Distribution of log food and log income

Blundell, Matzkin and Kristensen (2011)